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Abstract—The emergence of self-driving and semi self-driving 
vehicles which form vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) has 
attracted much interest in recent years. However, VANETs have 
some characteristics that make them more vulnerable to 
potential attacks when compared to other networks such as 
wired networks. The characteristics of VANETs are: an open 
medium, no traditional security infrastructure, high mobility and 
dynamic topology. In this paper, we build an intelligent intrusion 
detection system (IDS) for VANETs that uses a Proportional 
Overlapping Scores (POS) method to reduce the number of 
features that are extracted from the trace file of VANET 
behavior and used for classification. These are relevant features 
that describe the normal or abnormal behavior of vehicles. The 
IDS uses Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) and fuzzified data to 
detect black hole attacks. The IDSs use the features extracted 
from the trace file as auditable data to detect the attack. In this 
paper, we propose hybrid detection (misuse and anomaly) to 
detect black holes.  
Keywords—security; vehicular ad hoc networks; intrusion 
detection system; driverless car; self-driving car.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
       The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has 
been recognized vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) since 
October 2002 [1]. VANETs allow self-driving and semi self-
driving vehicles to communicate with each other and road side 
units (RSUs) without traditional trust infrastructures. These 
vehicles and RSUs can exchange Cooperative Awareness 
Messages (CAMs), control data and emergency notifications 
between them within radio coverage [2]. In VANETs, the 
three types of communication are vehicle to vehicle (V2V), 
vehicles to infrastructures (V2I) and infrastructures to 
infrastructure (I2I) [3]. These networks provide security and 
safety to passengers, drivers and vehicles by exchanging 
CAMs and emergency messages [4] [5]. They have some 
characteristics that expose them to different types of attacks at 
multiple levels of the network such as black hole, gray hole, 
rushing and DoS attacks. VANETs posses characteristics like 
high mobility, fast changing network topology, absence of 
fixed security infrastructures and open communication 
medium [6]. These characteristics also make security a 
challenge for these types of vehicles [2].   
Self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles are considered 
a new revolution in the automotive industry and scientific 
research. These vehicles are equipped with communication 
devices in the form of On Board Units (OBU) and an array of 
sensors and embedded systems [7]. These components allow 
vehicles and RSUs to generate and exchange CAMs to reduce 
the amount of accidents and traffics jam that occur from 
human errors. Figure 1 shows vehicles, RSUs and the 
occurrence of an accident. Once an accident has occurred, 
CAMs and control data are created and communicated to the 
RSUs and other vehicles in that zone.  
In our research, we simulate an intelligent intrusion 
detection system that is mounted directly in the vehicles rather 
than the RSUs, allowing for protection from potential attacks 
even when no RSUs are in the vicinity. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. An example of the process of responding to cases of 
emergency on the road 
In our research, we designed a new intrusion detection 
system to protect external communication in self-driving and 
semi self-driving vehicles from black hole attacks. The 
proposed security system offers real-time detection and 
isolation of malicious vehicles that have a direct negative 
impact on other vehicles in the zone. Detection depends on the 
features that are extracted from the trace file which is 
generated using network simulator version 2 (NS2) model.  
This paper is organized in the following way: Section II 
explores related works in the domain of attacks on external 
communication for self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles. 
Section III describes the methodology and section IV explains 
the experimental results. Section V discusses the results and 
outcomes of the scheme. Section VI is a summary of future 
works. 
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II.   RELATED WORKS 
In this research, our focus is on one of the most common 
attacks in VANETs, namely black hole attacks. Black hole 
vehicles are used to drop all received packets instead of 
forwarding them to a destination vehicle. It has three different 
objectives [8]: 
1) Inhibit forwarding of packets from one vehicle to its 
neighbor’s “destination node”. 
2) Inhibiting the reception of packets from other 
vehicles. 
3) Dropping all received packets. 
This attack can have a negative impact [9] because the 
performance of VANETs is directly influenced by internal 
and external attacks [10]. In this case, we are trying to protect 
networks against black hole attacks so that the network layer 
in the VANETs cannot be attacked [11]. 
Zhang et al. proposed two types of systems to detect 
attacks: anomaly detection and misuse detection [12]. Both 
rely on using features of the network to train an intrusion 
detection system. The proposed security system can then 
detect intruders and a potential attack on an ad hoc network. 
Kabiri et al. suggested a new approach of extracting suitable 
and static features from the trace files which describe the 
normal and abnormal behavior of vehicles in the network. 
They were able to infer the weight of the selected features 
[13]. The different numbers and types of features had a direct 
impact on the accuracy of the IDS. Singh et al. proposed an 
intrusion detection system to identify a malicious vehicle in 
external communication for self-driving [2]. They use 
cooperative intrusion detection (cross layers) to detect 
wormhole attacks using a security system that evaluated the 
decision packets at the destination station. Yan et al. 
advocated a novel solution by using a combinatorial approach 
collecting data from three different resources: radar detection, 
traffic and neighbouring data [14]. Thus, the system would 
compute the similarities between these sets of data. The 
authors considered the radar detection to be the trusted part of 
the system. Kaur et al. devised an intrusion detection system 
based on an artificial neural network (ANN) [15]. Lakshmi et 
al., focused on the importance of protecting VANETs by 
isolating malicious vehicles that were designed to damage the 
performance of the network. To identify a malicious vehicle 
they measured the performance of the network in terms of the 
packets’ delivery ratio, dropped packets, the average end-to-
end delay and routing overhead. [16].  
We can observe from previous studies that popular IDSs 
are based on a single approach in detection: either misuse or 
anomaly. In addition, the incumbent security system adopt all 
extracted features that capture normal and abnormal behavior 
in VANETs. 
The motivation of our research, is to design an intelligent 
hybrid security system based on misuse and anomaly 
detection. This will help providing enough protection for self-
driving and semi self-driving networks by detecting novel 
attack. Moreover, the proposed IDS is based on significant 
features that have been extracted from trace file by using POS 
method. To increase detection rate and decrease the number of 
false alarms, we employed the fuzzy set on selected features, 
i.e. fuzzification.  
Here we present a hybrid detection system that was 
different from the previous security systems by which it has 
ability to detect a new attack. In addition, we were able to 
decrease the number of features that have been extracted from 
the trace file. This is generated from network simulaton that 
describes normal and abnormal behavior for VANETs in self-
driving vehicles. In other words, the number of those features 
has been distributed by employing fuzzy sets which has a vital 
role in enhancing detection rate and decreasing the rate of 
false alarms. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In this paper, we propose an IDS that is based on a dataset 
which was collected from a trace file that was generated 
utlising NS2 to model the VANET and its environment. We 
have attempted to identify breaches in security for self-driving 
and semi self-driving vehicles. The steps below explain the 
methodology: 
A. Simulation of Urban Mobility Model  
We utlise simulator systems to evaluate and test the 
proposed protocols and algorithms in VANETs. The proposed 
simulator for the security system is NS2. In order to generate a 
realistic environment of normal and malicious behavior in 
VANETs. NS2 simulations require two types of inputs traffic 
and mobility scenarios. We generated them by using two 
software solutions: Simulation of Urban Mobility Model 
(SUMO) and MObilty VEhicles (MOVE) [17]. This software 
allowed the NS2 to successfully simulate VANETs with 
different scenarios. SUMO is widely known in the field of 
VANET simulations, it provides efficient computation even in 
various sizes of scenarios [18]. MOVE receives the files 
produced by SUMO by converting them to the NS2 format and 
immediately using in network simulation.  
In our research, we used the Manhattan urban mobility 
model to create a mobility and traffic scenario for vehicles. 
The reasons for selecting this type of mobility is a flexibility 
is selection of direction for vehicles and its adoption in 
research [19]. 
B. Feature Sets 
The two output files of the NS2 are a trace file and a 
network animator. These files are used for analysis and 
visualization of the behavior in VANETs. The security system 
relies on the features in the trace file which describes both 
normal and malicious behavior in the VANETs.  
The trace file generated in NS2 is divided into three 
groups: “basic trace”, “internet protocol trace” and “AODV 
trace” [18]. The features extracted from the trace file are used 
to evaluate the performance of the proposed IDS. The number 
of false alarms and detection rate of IDS depends on the type 
and the number of features.  
C. Feature Extraction 
The trace file describes the events of VANETs, it contains 
many different data features which are used for analysis. 
 
 
These features describe normal and abnormal/malicious 
behavior in VANETs. The number and the type of features 
have a vital direct role in the effective and efficient 
performance of the proposed IDS. 
To increase the efficiency and the accuracy of the 
detection system, we need to extract the most effective 
features upon which to base the IDS. In our research, we used 
a statistical approach to extract features that have a high 
weight value, namely the Proportional Overlapping Scores 
(POS) method [20].  
The distinguishing extracted features are singled out by 
analyzing the overlap among the expression values across two 
classes. We have been used package included function for 
calculate the proportional overlapping score for each feature 
in trace file avoiding the outliers effect. Relevant features 
selection are based on the measure for the overlap is the one 
defined in the POS technique. The dataset size of the selected 
features might be set by users [21].  
POS is considered suitable and efficient even with data 
that has classification problems such as the high-dimensional 
binary and outliers [21]. The identification features are picked 
by evaluating the overlap between feature values across both 
classes “normal or abnormal”.  
The POS is used to measure the overlapping rate between 
the features in the trace file [21], shown below is the POS 
algorithm pseudo code.    
Algorithm  POS Method 
1. Inputs: "data1.csv". 
2. Output: Sequence of the selected features. 
3. install.packages("propOverlap"). 
4. source("http://bioconductor.org/biocLite.R"). 
5. biocLite("Biobase"). 
5. library(propOverlap). 
6. ?propOverlap. 
7. getwd(). 
8. data <- read.csv("data1.csv",header=T). 
9. str(data). 
10. data <- t(data). 
11. G <- data[1:21,] # define the features matrix 21. 
12. G <- jitter(G). # to avoid the noise in data 
13. Class <- as.factor(data[22,]) #define the 
observations' class labels. 
14. set.seed(1234). 
15. Selection <- Sel.Features(G, Class, 
K=21,Verbose=TRUE) # the main function. 
16. Selection$Features. # extract the number of 
features  
17. Selection$Measures. # extract name of features. 
We extracted 21 features from the trace file and used the 
statistical R language to apply the POS pseudo code. These 
features are: Packet ID, Payload Size and Type, Source and 
Destination MAC, Ethernet, IP Source and Destination, 
Packet Tagged, Hop Counts, Broadcast ID, Destination IP 
with Sequence number and Source IP with Sequence number. 
The number and the type of features have a vital direct 
role in effective and efficient performance of the proposed 
IDS. The motivation behind the reduction in the number of 
features is computation time, memory and accuracy. We used 
the principle of trial-and-error to choose the best number of 
features based on the training rate. In our work, we started 
with the entire set of features. After each round of training we 
removed the feature which had the lowest weight. This 
process is repeated until we are left with a set comprising of 
only 15 features. This set of 15 features is used for the 
classification of normal and abnormal behavior. Table 1 
compares our IDS and previous studies where they authors 
employed all extracted features from trace file [22].  
Table 1 Performance Metrics 
 IDS with all Features IDS with 15 Features 
Training Rate 98.97% 99.86% 
Average False Alarm  6.21% 0.53% 
Error Rate 2.05% 0.15% 
TrainParam.Epochs 68 15 
D. Fuzzy Membership 
According to previous studies, many researchers utilised 
fuzzy set in order to avoid the classification problems [23]. The 
nature of the dataset that is extracted from the trace file 
“features” has a direct impact on the performance of IDS [24]. 
When the name of the classes for normal and abnormal 
behavior is not well separated the detection rate is decreased 
and the number of false alarms increases.  
Fuzzification is considered a suitable approach that 
classifies problems by creating clear border within extracted 
features [23].  
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Where a, b and c represent the fuzzy domain values while 
x is the normal value of the dataset before fuzzification. The 
main motives of applying fuzzification data is to increase the 
detection rate of IDS as well as decrease the number of false 
alarms generated from IDS. It resolves ambiguity and 
confusion through adding five new values for each previous  
value of the features.  According to equation 1 each value 
from the dataset takes five values from the fuzzy domain and 
the range of the interval is [0,1]. 
E. Simulation Environmental and Parameters 
A VANET is created on the NS2 as shown in figure 4. In 
our simulation, we designed two malicious vehicles that 
represente black hole attacks. A common problem that is 
exposed when simulating the VANETs with NS2 is a realistic 
mobility model and traffic model because the NS2 is designed 
for wired and wireless networks [19]. To overcome this 
problem, we used the SUMO and MOVE tools to create 
realstic mobility and traffic model for VANETs [25].  
A screenshot of NS2 utilizing a NAM trace file is shown 
in figure 2. Figure 2 shows Manhattan mobility model that 
consists of 9 RSUs and 40 vehicles (38 normal vehicles and 2 
black hole vehicles). 
 
 
             Fig. 2 Simulation in NS2 NAM 
The initial parameters determine the behavior and the 
performance of the proposed system in NS2. These 
parameters are: simulation time, channel type, speed, number 
of vehicles and RSU, routing protocol and mobility model 
[19]. 
F. Intelligent Intrusion Detection System 
The proposed intelligent IDS uses a feed forward neural 
network (FFNN) to detect black hole vehicles from normal 
vehicles in VANETs. In our research, we prepared 60000 
dataset records to simulate the proposed security system. This 
data describes normal and abnormal behavior on the 
VANETs. The collected data are divided into three subsets: 1) 
a training (50%), 2) a testing (25%) and 3) a validation (25%) 
subset.  
We used the principle of trial-and-error to select the best 
structure of FFNN employed in the proposed security system. 
Table 4 shows some of the parameters of the training phase of 
the FFNN. The value parameters which have been used in 
training phase are TrainParam. Epochs=15, 
TrainParam.lr=1*10-7, TrainParam.goal=0 and 
TrainParam.min_grad =  1*10-12.  
We simulated the system the Intel 5744 core i3-380M  
processor based PC operating at 2.53GHz and 4 GB RAM 
memory.  
G. Generating Malicious behavior  
Here, we generated two types of scenarios: normal and 
abnormal behavior to evaluate the performance of proposed 
security system. A mobility node is called black hole vehicle 
when it drops the received packets from other vehicles. To 
generate black hole behavior in VANETs, modification were 
made to some files of the routing protocol such as AODV. In 
other words, the black hole vehicles are used to drop all 
received packets rather than forward them to a destination 
vehicle. The VANET environment used in our proposal 
consists of 40 vehicles and 9 RSUs on a simulator system [19]. 
H. The Proposed IDS    
The proposed security system used FFNN that consists of 
three layers: an input layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer. 
The first layer consists of 75 neurons equal to the number of 
fuzzified features.  Our research utilizes the training rate for 
determining the number of neurons in the hidden layer. In 
other words, we found that the best training rate is utilizing 8 
neurons. The output layer consists of 3 neurons (“normal, 
abnormal and unknown”), figure 3 shows the overall 
architecture of the proposed security system, namely: 
1. The first stage (Generate the mobility and the traffic 
model): At this stage, we used both “ SUMO and 
MOVE” to generate the suitable scenarios for NS2. 
These files are considered input files for the simulation 
system. 
2. The second stage (NS2): The normal and malicious 
behavior for vehicles is generated. We get two output 
files: trace and NAM files. The dataset is extracted from 
the trace file generated from the NS2. 
3. The third stage (Data collection and Pre-processing): The 
features are extracted from the data in the trace file. The 
features are preprocessed by converting them to numeric 
values and the values were normalized to values between 
0 and 1 according to the equation 2:  
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Normalising data often permits to increase the detection 
rate  and enhance the performance of ANN [24]. 
4. The fourth stage (Extracting the main features): In this 
stage, we extracted the main features from the trace file. 
OPS is one of the efficient statistical methods that used to 
calculating the overlapping between features [20]. It was 
used to extract features that have high priority value. 
5. The fifth stage (Fuzzy set): We used the fuzzy set to 
convert the selected features to their fuzzified 
counterparts to fix the huge dataset overlap. 
6. The sixth stage (Training phase): We trained the ANN 
with the extracted dataset (main features). We created a 
repeat condition at this stage to get the best ratio of 
training. We divided the raw dataset that we extracted 
from the trace file into six subsets, each subset containing 
ten thousand records. For each iteration of the training 
cycle, we used a different subset for training. Hence we 
used three subsets (30000 records), which resulted in a 
training rate of  99.86%. 
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Fig. 3 Architecture of IDS 
 
 
The hybrid “anomaly and misuse” detection methods are 
applied to an ANN that can learn the normal or abnormal 
behavior through the iterative process. The main motivation 
for using the ANN is to reduce costs, efficiency and to improve 
real-time responsiveness [26].  
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The proposed security system can detect two different 
behaviors: normal or abnormal/ malicious through the IDS. In 
this subsection, we demonstrate the efficiency of the detection 
system. The error rate is used as a performance metric to 
evaluate the IDS. 
Anomaly detection or behavior detection systems are 
employed to identify behavior that describes normal or 
abnormal for self-driving vehicles while misuse detection 
systems or database detection are based on the characteristics 
of known attacks that are generated from VANETs. The 
behavior detection possesses a positive detection error, 
difficulty handling gradual misbehavior and expensive 
computation. The database detection has a low rate of false 
alarms, but they cannot detect novel types of attacks [24].  
A. Training and Testing Neural Network with (Misuse 
Detection) 
The training and testing phase uses the fuzzification dataset 
in both phases (signature), to calculate the total accuracy of the 
IDS, true positive, false positive, true negative, false negative. 
The total accuracy of the training classification was 99.8%. We 
used one subset (10000 records) in the testing phase. Table 2 
shows the performance of the classification system and number 
of records of features used in the IDS.  
Table 2 Classification Rate 
                             IDS 
Class Original Records ANN 
Match 
Records 
Miss 
Records Accuracy 
Normal 6382 6381 6375 6 99.89% 
Abnormal 3618 3617 3611 6 99.80% 
Unknown 0 0 0 2 NaN 
In our research, we calculated four types of alarms: True 
Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN) and 
False Negative (FN) to measure and evaluate the performance 
of IDSs. Table 3 shows the rates of four alarms. 
Table 3 Alarms Rate 
Alarm Type Accuracy 
True positive 99.90% 
True negative 99.83% 
False negative 0.09% 
False positive 0.16% 
B. Training and Testing Neural Network (Anomaly 
Detection) 
The testing phase used a fuzzified data set that differs 
from the data set used in the training phase (anomaly). We 
calculated the total accuracy to evaluate the proposed IDS. The 
anomaly detection system must be able to identify novel 
attacks, therefore we used three subsets (30000 records) in the 
testing phase, table 4 shows the performance of classification 
and number of records used in the proposed system: 
Table 4 Classification Rate 
  IDS    
Class Original Records ANN 
Match 
Records 
Miss 
Records Accuracy 
Normal 19285 19288 19261 27 99.87% 
Abnormal 10715 10698 10685 13 99.72% 
Unknown 0 14 0 14 NaN 
Table 5 shows the rates of four alarms. 
Table 5 Alarms Rate 
Alarm Type Accuracy 
True positive 99.86% 
True negative 99.87% 
False negative 0.14% 
False positive 0.12% 
V. DISCUSSION 
We designed an IDS to secure external communication of 
self-driving and semi self-driving cars by detecting black hole 
vehicles in the VANETs environment. The proposed security 
system is implemented in seven phases: generate the mobility 
and the traffic model, network simulation version 2, data 
collection and pre-processing phase, extracting the main 
features, fuzzification of the data, training phase and testing 
phase.  
Our experiments confirm that the performance of the IDS 
is efficiently detecting black hole vehicles with a low false 
alarm rate. The results indicated a high accuracy of detection 
rate whether normal or abnormal that fluctuated between 
99.89% and 99.72% with a low error rate of only 0.15%. 
Furthermore, the anomaly detection system also has a low false 
alarm rate of 0.14%.  
In our research, the detection rate ranges between 99.72% 
and 99.98%. When comparing these results with our previous 
research where fuzzy sets were not used we obtained a 
detection rate that ranges from 85.02% to 99.12% [22]. The 
percentage of false alarms ranges between 0.9% and 0.16%, 
when comparing these results with our previous research 
where fuzzy sets were not used, we obtained a false alarm rate 
ranging from 0.17% to 12.24% [22]. According to the results, 
we can notice differences between the ratio of detection and 
false alarms. The use of fuzzy set increases the detection rate 
while decreasing the number of false alarms. We can notice 
compared to the previous studies that the proposed system has 
improved detection and overcome the dataset problems such as 
overlapping and interference by applying the POS in order to 
extract the main features and performing a fuzzy set 
“fuzzification” on the dataset which was extracted from the 
trace file. This approach has a direct positive impact on the 
result by increasing the detection rate, decreasing the false 
alarm rate and error rate. However, the main drawback is that 
the system needs extra memory resources to store data and the 
approach is more computationally heavy. A low error rate 
indicates that the IDS is effective and efficient in identifying 
anomaly and misuse “hybrid detection” with a high accuracy 
 
 
and a low false positive alarm rate. Our proposed work can be 
extracted to build IDS which can detect other types of attacks 
such as gray and wormhole attacks.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles are heavily based 
on the external communication to exchange and broadcast 
CAMs, emergence notification and control data. In addition, 
these vehicles cannot predict the external environment without 
VANETs.  In this case, the security of these networks is crucial 
for deployment and development of these types of vehicles.   
The identification and isolation of black hole vehicles in 
VANETs can be achieved through an intelligent IDS guarding 
awareness messages and control data being communicated. 
Black hole vehicle prevents the transmission of CAMs and 
notification messages from vehicle to vehicle or infrastructure 
by dropping each received packet in that zone. In this case, a 
reliable detection system is necessary to provide the required 
security for external communication for these vehicles. An 
open environment that permits different types of attacks that 
can have negative impact on the emergence of these vehicles. 
In our research, we have built an intelligent detection system 
to secure external communication to self-driving and semi 
self-driving cars. This approach has been designed for training 
and testing of two system scenarios: normal and malicious 
that have been created on the NS2. Our approach is to analysis 
the behavior of each mobility vehicle in the VANETs to 
identify if it is a black hole vehicle or normal vehicle. If a 
vehicle drops all received data from closed vehicle, this is 
detected as a black hole vehicle. One of the important aspects 
for the proposed IDS is the capability of identifying both 
existing and novel attacks. Based on this experiment, our 
hybrid IDS has demonstrated good performance in detecting 
and isolating black hole attacks in external communication of 
self-driving vehicles. The process of reducing the extracted 
features by POS method had a significant role in improving 
the performance of the security system. In addition, the fuzzy 
set help reducing the error rate and the number of false alarms 
when compared with our previous research. 
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